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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for personal 
injury and property damage resulting from an automo-
bile accident which occurred at a blind intersection con-
trolled by a semaphore signal. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial jury on special interrogatories and acting 
on instructions of the court below found the defendant 
11egligent in running a red semaphore but also found the 
plaintiff negligent in failing to maintain a proper look-
out, whereupor, the court entered judgment of ''No 




RELIEF SOUGH'l.1 ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and jmlg-
ment in his favor as a matter of law on the liability issue 
and a new trial on the issue of damages or, that failing, 
a new trial on all issues of the case. 
STATEl\lENT OF FACTS 
The controversy which is the subject of this lawsuit 
arises out of a re~atively simple fact situation. Plain-
tiff and defendant were operating automobiles which 
collided at the intersection of 4500 South and 1300 East 
Streets in Salt Lake County at approximately 8 :00 a.m. 
on December 30, 1963. Immediately prior to the colli-
sion plaintiff was traveling east 011 4500 South Street and 
defendant was traveling south on 1300 East Street. 'l'he 
accident occurred during daylight hours and the atmos-
phere was clear and the road surface was dry. Because 
of topographic and other conditions at the intersection, 
neither driver could see in the direction from ~which the 
other was approaching until his automobile was almost 
into the intersection. Traffic at the intersection is con-
trolled by a semaphore signal. 
Conditions at the intersection are illustrated by sev-
eral photographs received in evidence (Exhibits P 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 and Exhibit D 9). The intersection is 
"blind" as to the corresponding views of vehicles ap-
proaching from the west and north herause 1300 East 
Street drops off abruptly to the 11orth of 4500 South 
Street leaving a dirt embankment betwPen approaching 
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vehicles. There are also some trees, telephone poles and 
shrubbery located near the intersection. The defendant 
explained the visibility as follows: (R. 238) 
'' Q. As you approach this intersection coming 
south, can you see 45th South to the west? 
A. When you are on 13th East traveling south, 
it's difficult to see 4500 South until you are prac-
tically right on it. 
Q. Docs it start to come into your view as you 
come up that hill~ 
A. -Well, you have got to be almost immediately 
on it before you can sec the 4500 South any dis-
tance west.'' 
and (R. 243) 
'' Q. You are very familiar with the intersection 
are you'? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. And it is your judgment that you couldn't see 
a car any distance west on 45th South until you 
got almost into the intersection. Is that correct! 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And you didn't see this other car at all until 
just a moment before the impact? 
A. That is correct.'' 
The plaintiff, Mr. Badger, who was also familiar with 
the intersection was in doubt as to whether or not a ve-
hirle approaching from the west could see a south-bound 
automobile when the latter was right at the intersection 
next to the telephone poles located at the corner (R. 
217). The evidence discloses that neither driver saw 
the other until just before the impact (R. 218, 243). 
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The principal liability issue involved determina-
tion of which driver had the green light in his favor. 
There was little conflict in the testimony with respect to 
the other issues. 
Plaintiff testified that he was returning to his home 
at the time of the accident. He said that he slowed as he 
approached the intersection and that when he was about 
120 to 125 feet west of the intersection the light turned 
green and he proceeded into the intersection at a speed 
of approximately 20 to 25 miles per hour (R. 141). 
The defendant was on his way to work at the time 
of the accident. When he first saw the light it was green 
for southbound traffic. He recalls having seen the light 
about a block ( 600 feet) north of the intersection (R. 
243-244). From this point he traveled at a constant speed 
of approximately 25 to 30 miles per hour to the point of 
impact (R. 244). He testified on direct examination 
that the light "turned from green to orange" just be-
fore he entered the intersection (R. 171). On cross-ex-
amination he could not say for sure whether or not he 
actually saw the light change ( R. 246). 
Other witnesses who testified on the liability issue 
included the investigating officer, a foreman for the Salt 
Lake County Street Lighting Department and two eye 
witnesses, Paules Peterson and Pieter Klein. 
The investigating officer established the point of im-
pact of the vehicles and testified that no brakes were 
applied by either vehicle. He also established from the 
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physical evidence at the accident scene that the Buick 
automobile driven by the defendant was involved in a 
col1ision with two other vehicles near the crosswalk on 
the south side of the intersection after the initial impact 
·with plaintiff's automobile. He further testified that 
he observed the operation of the semaphore light after 
he arrived at the scene of the accident for about 20 to 
25 minutes and that the light was working normally 
(R. 83). He testified that the light remained on amber 
for G to 6 seconds as timed by the sweep hand of his 
watch (R. 86). 
The Salt Lake County Lighting Department Fore-
man, Armond Myers, testified with respect to time inter-
vals of the various lights of the semaphore. He testified 
that the amber light for north~south traffic was displayed 
for a period of 5 seconds (R. 103). An exhibit kept by 
Mr. Myers in the ordinary course of his business and re-
ceived in evidence discloses that the interval for the green 
light controlling north-south traffic was 14 seconds (Ex-
hibit P-2). 
Pieter Klein, testified that just prior to the accident 
he had been traveling north on 1300 East Street in a 
Dodge automobile. He intended to make a left turn at 
the intersection of 4500 South and as he approached the 
intersection he was traveling at a speed of approximately 
20 miles per hour (R. 117-118). When he was about 100 
feet back from the intersection the light turned yellow 
ancl he made a "slow stop" which he estimated con-
s urned approximately 7 seconds (R. 117-118, 119). Klein 
6 
stopped his automobile next to the pedestrian lane at the 
intersection. When he was about 20 feet from the cross-
walk he saw defendant's automobile straight ahead of 
him and approximately 200 feet north of the intersec-
tion (R. 119-120). Klein testified that the Buick auto-
mobile traveled at a constant speed from the time he first 
saw it until it entered the intersection at a speed of 
approximately 35 miles per hour and collided with the 
plaintiff's automobilee (R. 120). 
The other eye witness, Paules Peterson, had been trav-
eling north in a Chevrolet truck behind the Klein auto-
mobile. He was driving his truck at a speed of ap-
proximately 20 to 25 miles per hour when he saw the 
light change to yellow (R. 132). Peterson could see that 
Klein ·was going to make a left turn and since Peterson 
intended to proceed directly on through the intersection 
he turned to the right of the Dodge automobile and made 
a "slow stop" (R. 132). Peterson estimated that it took 
10 to 15 seconds for him to stop his vehicle after he 
saw the light turn yellow ( R. 132). Peterson saw the 
vehicles collide in the iutersection hut he did not know 
exactly where his vehicle was when the defendant's auto-
mobile entered the intersection. 
The plaintiff was thrown out of his automobile by 
the impact and sustained severe personal injuries as a 
result of which he wil1 be permanently disabled to a sub-
stantial extent and will probably require a shoulder 
fusion which will render his shoulder joint completely 
immobile (R. 185). The gravity of the injury is aggra-
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vatec1 by the fact that plaintiff does not have a normal 
right arm. Plaintiff also sustained substantial damages 
for loHt wages plus medical expense of approximately 
$1,600 and property damage of approximately $1,500. 
'rhe court submitted the cau8e to the jurors on a spe-
eial verdict which requirecl them to determine specificall>' 
as to each driver "What negligent acts proximately 
cause(l the collision" (R. 52). In instructing on the law 
of the case the court fully aclvised the jury on the motor-
ist's duty with respect to semaphore signals and also 
~~·an' a specific instruction with respect to lookout for 
otlH'r vehicles. In the latter instance the court instruct-
f'(l the jury by his Instruction No. 17 that there is a duty 
imposed on a driver of an automobile "to be awarP of 
tl1c relative positions and speeds of vehicles approach-
ing and he must recurrently reohscrve and reappraise in 
the light of the consistent changing conditions of a fluid 
traffic situation" (R. 46). 
The jury was out for deliberations (interrupted only 
h~, the mealtime recess) for approximately 6 hours (R. 
234, 265). By their special verdict the jury unanimously 
<ldcrmined that the defendant had run the red light and 
by a six to two verdict the jury determined that the plain-
tiff had failed to keep a "proper lookout" (R. 52. See 
also R. 265-266). Judgment of "No Cause of Action" 
\\'as cnterrd on the special verdict and the plaintiff's 





THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUC-
TION NO. 17 WHICH IN SUBSTANCE 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT PLAIN-
TIFF HAD AN ABSOLUTE DUTY AS HE 
APPROACHED THE INTERSECTION TO 
OBSERVE OTHER VEHICLES APPROACH-
ING, ENTERING AND CROSSING THE IN-
TERSECTION AND TO CONTINUALLY 
REAPPRAISE THE SPEEDS, DISTANCES 
AND RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE 
OTHER VEHICLES [EVEN THOUGH 
PLAINTIFF WAS PROCEEDING WITH 
THE GREENLIGHTAND COULD NOT SEE 
APPROACHING VEHICLES BECAUSE OF 
THE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE INTERSECTION]. 
The instruction of which plaintiff here complains 
reads in its entirety as follows: 
"Instruction No. 17 
You are instructed that even though the oper-
a tor of an automobile has the right-of-way, he still 
has the duty to keep and to maintain a reasonable, 
proper, and adequate lookout and to use reason-
able and ordinary care to avoid a collision. One 
who has the right of way must use due care while 
crossing and must continue to keep a reasonable 
lookout and reappraise the situation as he ap-
proaches an intersection and use reasonable and 
ordinary care under the circumstances to avoid 
a collision as he proceeds. 
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There is imposed upon a driver the duty to be 
aware of the relative positions and speeds of ve-
hicles approaching and he must recurrently re-
observe a;nd reappraise in the light of the consis-
tent changing conditions of a fluid traffic situa-
tion. Therefore, even if you should find from 
the evidence in this case that either driver had 
the technical right-of-way, you should also con-
sider that such right-of-way is a relative right 
only, and if he was careless in failing to keep and 
continue to keep a reasonable and adequate look-
out or failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary 
care under the circumstances to avoid a collision 
and that such negligence, if any, proximately con-
tributed in any substantial degree to cause the 
collision, he would be negligent.'' (Emphasis 
added.) 
The importance of the instruction is manifest since 
plaintiff was denied recovery on the basis of the jury's 
interpretation of what constituted a "proper lookout" 
under the law of the case (special verdict R. 52). By the 
instruction complained of the court specifically instruct-
ed the jury what reasonable care required, to wit: that 
''there is imposed upon a driver the duty to be aware 
of the rel,ative positions and speeds of vehicles ap-
proaching and he must recurrently reobserve and reap-
praise in the light of the consistent changing conditions of 
a fluid traffic situation." 
Plaintiff took due exception to the instruction con-
tending in substance that the instruction nullified the 
"reasonable care" standard and would be tantamount to 
a directed verdict against plaintiff because it would be 
impossible for plaintiff to be aware of the changing 
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position of defendant's automobile as plaintiff ap-
proached the intersection (R. 255-256). 
In order to discharge the duty imposed by Instruc-
tion No. 17 a motorist approaching a blind intersection 
is required as a matter of law to accomplish the impos-
sible feat of seeing approaching vehicles which cannot be 
seen because of physical terrain or in the alternative to 
slow or stop his vehicle at the intersection where he can 
see other approaching vehicles and, if necessary, stop 
before entering the intersection even though he enters on 
a green light. 
The instruction is erroneous because it imposes an 
absolute duty to be aware of other vehicles instead of a 
duty of reasonable care to observe and also because under 
the circumstances of this case the duty imposed was im-
possible to comply with unless possibly plaintiff had 
stopped at the intersection and looked up and dmvn the 
cross street for approaching vehicles. 
The duty to see another vehicle approaching an in-
tersection is not absolute even where the terrain is such 
that one can be seen and there is no traffic control sign 
or signal at the intersection. This principal is estab-
lished in Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747 
(1952). The Martin case involved a collision at an open 
intersection. Plaintiff had the right of way. The trial 
court refused to permit plaintiff's case to go to the jury 
on the theory that plaintiff had a duty as a matter of lavv 
to see defendant·~ automobile approaching and that his 
failure to see the defendant's vehicle sooner than he did 
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was negligence as a matter of law. On appeal defend-
ant's counsel contended that an open intersection col-
lision will not occur unless hoth drivers are negligent and 
fail to see each other. The Supreme Court reversed, re-
jecting the contention that plaintiff had an absolute 
duty to see defendant's vehicle. In so holding the Court 
said: 
"No matter how far afield one may go in review-
ing, analyzing and rationalizing the decisions in 
these intersection cases, he must always come back 
to the one basic concept which underlies and con-
trols the Law of Torts: The conduct of the mythi-
cal but extremely useful 'ordinary reasonable pru-
dent man under the circumstances,' all of which is 
encompassed in the shorter phrase 'due care.' " 
''That iR the standard we apply to the plaintiff. 
Admittedly, the right of way is not absolute. One 
who has it, under one or both of the aforemen-
tioned rules may not, with foolhardy assurance, 
claim the right of way in the face of danger which 
one exercising due care would see and avoid. Al-
though plaintiff had the right of way under both 
rules above referred to, yet there devolved upon 
him the duty of due care in observing for other 
traffic. But in doing so he had the right to as-
sume, and to rely and act on the assumption that 
others would do like·wise; he was not obliged to an-
ticipate either that other drivers would drive neg-
ligently, nor fail to accord him his right of way, 
until in the exercise of due care, he observed, or 
should han' observed, something to warn him that 
the other driver was driving negligently or would 
fail to accord him his right of way. If this prin-
ciple is not clear in the earlier Utah cases, it is 
firmly established by the more recent expressions 
of this court.'' 
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In Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2d 510, 
plaintiff was traveling on an arterial highway. Defend-
ant's ambulance approached from a cross street and ran 
a stop sign. There were no obstructions to vision of 
the intersection and the court instructed that both parties 
were negligent as a matter of law. The issue of proxi-
mate cause was submitted to the jury and a verdict for 
plaintiff was sustained on appeal. The Supreme Court 
was eYenly divided as to whether or not plaintiff was 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law in not looking 
for traffic approaching the arterial highway. (The fifth 
judge concurred in the result.) Justice ·wolf e's opinion 
analyzed the situation as follows: 
"In the first place, the trial court was distinctly 
in error in instructing the jur>' that the plaintiff 
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law ... 
The [trial] court may have been misled by our 
case of Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, !18 P. 2d 
350. But the facts of that case were far different 
from those in this case. In that case there was no 
stop sign - no designation of arterial highway ... 
"In this case the plaintiff was in ]aw in no such 
position. Whether he could have ascertained from 
a view up 31st Street that the driver of the am-
bulance was not going to stop or at what point 
he could have so ascertained it, if he could have 
done so at all, until it was too late to stop, is 
strictly, under the facts of this case, for the jury. 
He was on an arterial. He could rely on the am-
bulance stopping before he reached the intersec-
tion until he was or should have been definitely 
aware that it was not going to do so. At that time 
he may ha Ye been well out in the intersection. Onl>" 
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at that point did his duty to stop or accelerate 
his speed - viz. attempt to avoid the accident, 
begin. Only then if he had not acted as a prudent 
man would have acted under the circumstances 
would he be guilty of contributory negligence. And 
even at that point if defendant thrust upon him 
the necessity of exercising a quick choice of ac-
tion the jury should take that factor of emergency 
judgment into account in determining whether he 
was contributorily negligent. 
''Thus, the court was in error in instructing the 
jury that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of 
law.'' 
Even where a motorist's view is such that he can see 
approaching vehicles the duty to be aware of such ve-
hicles is not in many cases an absolute duty, as illustrated 
by the foregoing decisions. Certainly where there are 
obstructions to view or as in this case a total blocking of 
the view the duty of reasonable care caonnot be held to 
require as a matter of law that the motorist "be aware" 
of approaching vehicles. 
Further, where the motorist has the right of way be-
C'ause he is proceeding with the green light, the right to 
assume non-negligence distinguishes the lookout duty 
from the ordinary open intersection case. See e.g. Hess 
v. Robinson, supra; Youngblood v. Robison, 239 La. 338, 
118 So. 2d 1431, Annotation at 2 ALR 3rd 12. 
Instruction No. 17 appears to be tailored from a por-
tion of the language of the court's opinion in the case of 
Hickok v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d 514. The "duty 
to be aware of the relative positions and speeds of ve-
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hicles approaching" and the duty to "recurrently reoh-
serve arnl reappraise" mm;t be considered in light of 
the facts involved in the Hickok case. Plaintiff in that 
case actually saw the defendant's automobile one-half 
block away hut did not look again in the direction of de-
fendant's automobile until the time of impact. 'rhe court 
in the Hickok case held that the plaintiff having testified 
that he s:rw defendant's automobile and was uninformed 
as to its speed and having failed to avail himself of an 
ample opportunity to look again in the direction of de-
fendant's approaching automohile and reappraise its 
relatiYe position was guilty of negligence. It is rea(lily 
apparent that the (luty to "be aware of approaching au-
tomobiles" and to "rcobserve mid reapriraise" while 
appropriate under the facts of the Hickok case, have no 
application to the facts of the case at bar where the cir-
cumstances were such that the moto1·ist conlcl not see ap-
proaching Yehicles until he was at thP intersection. The 
instruction as applied to the facts of the case at bar is 
clearly an trroneous statement of the law. 
The prejudicial effect of Instrnction No. 17 is most 
obvious. It must be presnme<l that the jury fo11owcr1 
the instruction in determining the issne of lookout. Un-
der the circnmstances of this case the instruction cor:1-
pelled the jury to find tlrnt the plaintiff did not keep a 
"proper lookont" lwca use lte ·was not nware of cle-
fenclant 's approaching antomohik and clicl not see it until 
just a moment before the impact. Plnintiff was deprind 
of recover;r solel>· on the basis of thr jury's finding- "-ith 
respect to lookont. N otwitlrntarnfoig the eno110011s in-
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struction two jurors dissented to the finding. In fairness 
and justice the judgment cannot be permitted to stand 
iu the face of such patent error. 
POINT II 
THE .JURY FINDING ON PROXIMATE 
CAUSE IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE 
AND CONTRARY TO THE LAW UNDER 
'rHE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
AND THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. 
Plaintiff was denied recovery in this cause on the 
basis of the jury's finding that he was negligent in fail-
ing to observe a "proper lookout" and that such was a 
proximate cause of the collision. It is asserted under 
Point I of this Brief that the jury was erroneously in-
structed with respect to the plaintiff's duty to maintain 
a lookout. It is respectfully submitted, however, that in 
any event a failure to maintain a proper lookout on the 
part of plaintiff could not have been a proximate cause 
of the collision. 
It is significant that the jury did not find plaintiff 
negligent in any particular except as to lookout. Since 
question number one of the special verdict required the 
jury to determine specifically "what negligent acts proxi-
mately caused the collision" the absence of a finding of 
negligence except on the issue of lookout necessarily de-
termines that plaintiff was not negligent in driving at an 
excessive rate of speed, failing to slow down as he ap-
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proached the intersection, failing to keep his car under 
proper control, entering against the semaphore, failure 
to yield the right of way, or in any other particular. On 
the other hand, the jury expressly found that the de-
fendant was in the intersection ·when the light was reel 
and that this constituted negligence \Vhich was a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. In other words, it must he 
assumed from the special findings of the jury that plain-
tiff entered on the green semaphore at a reasonable rate 
of speed and with his Yehicle under proper control, but 
that he clid not maintain the lookout which the court re-
quired under its instructions to the jury. A lack of dili-
gence in maintaining a lookout could not possibly have 
been the eause of the accident for reasons presently to 
be demonstrated. 
Failure to keep a proper lookout is not the proximate 
cause of an accident unless the driver hy maintaining a 
proper lookout could have avoided the accident. A case 
illustrating this principle of Jaw is Morris v. Christensen, 
11 Utah 2d 140, 356 P. 2d 34. In the Morris case the 
plaintiff was proceedings through an intersection on a 
green light and failed to see the defcndm1t 's automo-
bile approaching on the cross street until just before the 
impact. On appeal the Supreme Court held that the trial 
judge had reasonably and properly concluded that plain-
tiff's observation of approaching traffic would not han' 
forewarned him of the impending hazard and that a fail-
ure to keep a proper lookout under such cirrumstances 
was not a proximate cause of the collision. In so hold-
ing the court ennneiatecl. the rule of proximate eansP 
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which applies to the facts of the case at bar: 
"It is the duty of a driver to observe and to see 
what there is to see so as to be able to exercise 
ordinary precaution to prevent collisions such as 
this. This duty extends to the favored driver with 
the right of way as well as to the disfavored 
driver. But he who has the right of way need 
not anticipate sudden outbursts of negligence on 
the part of another driver. Indeed, it may be said 
that the failure to observe is negligence proxi-
mately contributing to the harm orily where by ob-
sen:ing the driver could have avoided or lessened 
the resulting harm." (Emphasis added.) 
In the case at bar plaintiff had no opportunity to 
avoid the collision after he could have first seen the de-
f end ant's automobile proceeding into the intersection. 
Each driver acknowledged that the other motorist's ve-
hicle could not be seen until the drivers were almost into 
the intersection. The photographs received in evidence 
corroborate the testimony in this particular. The col-
lision occurred when plaintiff's vehicle was only 11 feet 
and defendant's vehicle was only 29 feet into the inter-
section. (Pedestrian lanes were 10 feet back from the 
rurb and point of impact was 21 feet 3 inches and 39 feet 
4 inches from pedestrian lanes. See R. 77-80 and Exhibit 
1. At 25 miles per hour plaintiff was traveling 36 feet 
per second, and the defendant at 30 miles per hour was 
traveling 44 feet per second. The ordinary stopping dis-
tance for an automobile traveling at the rate of 25 miles 
per hour with allowance for reaction time is 59 feet. 
·when plaintiff was 59 feet from the point of impact 
(which was 48 feet from the west edge of the intersec-
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tion), the defendant's automobile had to be at least 72 
feet from the point of impact ·which was 43 feet from the 
north edge of the intersection. [This is computed by de-
termining the time interval requireu for plaintiff to trav-
el 59 feet at 36 feet per second and determining how far 
defendant would travel in that interval at 44 feet per 
second.] 
Even if plaintiff's reaction had been perfect and 
had he been looking to the left (instead of to the right 
or at the semaphore or straight ahead of him, which are 
all places where a driver must he looking as he ap-
proaches an intersection) at the nry instant defend-
ant's car first became visible it would still han been 
totally impossible for the plaintiff to have stopped his 
automobile short of the point of impart. rrhis does not 
take into account that plaintiff having the light in his 
favor had the right to assume that defendant woulcl yield 
the right of ·way until in the exercise of due care plain-
tiff should liaYe known to the contrary. 
'l'hus plaintiff, after first seeing the def endaut 's au-
tomobile, would have to determine that defernlant in Yie"· 
of his speed and approach "·as not going to yield the right 
of way, whereupon plaintiff ·would first become obligated 
to take evasive action. After first recognizing danger 
and before plaintiff could take any evasin' action ·what-
ever the ordinary interval for reaction time ( % second) 
would allow his car to move 27 feet. This is obYiously 
why neither driver had a chance to apply his brakes or 
turn his vehicle before the collision nnu "·h~· eaeh s~rn-
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the other only a split second before the collision. The 
mathematics are such that neither could have seen the 
other even a full second before the collision. 
It is thus submitted that at the time of plaintiff's 
first opportunity to observe the other vehicle there was 
nothing plaintiff could do to avoid the accident and that 
a failure to keep a proper lookout could not have pos-
sibly been the proximate cause of the accident. Morris 
Y. Christensen, supra. 
POINT III. 
THE VERDICT IS FATALLY INCONSIS-
TENT AND CONTRADICTORY. 
By its verdict the jury has found that plaintiff was 
guilty of negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout, 
but that defendant was not guilty of negligence in this 
particular. Since the rights and duties with respect to 
lookout are reciprocal (except to the extent that plain-
tiff as the favored driver had the right to assume that 
other traffic would yield to his vehicles) it cannot be said 
with reason that defendant maintained a proper lookout 
hnt that plaintiff did not. 
The testimony of each driver was that he did not see 
the other automobile until just a moment before the im-
pact, and each testified that traffic on the cross street 
could not be seen until the motorist was almost into the 
intersection. [Actually neither driver's neglect in main-
taining a lookout could possibly have been a proximate 
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cause of the accident.] It may be argued with reason 
that the jury's tacit finding that defendant was not guilty 
of proximal negligence in failing to maintain a proper 
lookout is necessarily a finding that plaintiff could not 
have been guilty of negligence in this particular. The 
jury's finding that one driver was negligent with respect 
to lookout and that another was not under identical cir-
cumstances demonstrates a total lack of comprehension 
on the part of the jury with respect to the duty to main-
tain a lookout and nullifies the validity of the finding on 
the issue of lookout. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted for the reasons here-
tofore stated that the court incorrectly instru0ted the 
jury on the issue of lookout; that the court's instruction 
was so framed that it constituted, if followed by the jury, 
a directed verdict against plaintiff; that under the evi-
dence plaintiff's failure to maintain a lookout could not 
have been a proximate cause of the collision, and that 
the jnry 's finding on the issue of lookout is nullified by 
a patent error in the application of reciprocal duties be-
tween the drivers involved. Plaintiff respectfully sub-
mits that the jury having found negligence on the part of 
defendant which was a proximate cause of the collision, 
and it having been demonstrated under the evidence and 
as a matter of ]aw that the failure of the plaintiff to 
maintain a proper lookout could not have been a proxi-
mate cause of the accident, that plaintiff is entit1N1 to 
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judgment on the issue of liability and the cause should 
be remanded for trial on the issues of damages only. In 
the event the court fails to reverse and remand for trial 
on the damages issue alone, then the cause should be re-
manded for new trial on all issues of the case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
Suite 300, 141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR • 
.Attorneys for .Appellant 
